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ABSTRACT
With the 2002 double homicide case of State v. Edwards as their
backdrop, the Authors discuss Alaska Rule of Evidence 104(b) and the
concept of conditional relevance. Using the example of a letter written by one
of the victims in the Edwards case, the Authors explain how, although there
was no evidence that the letter was ever mailed to or read by the defendant,
the prosecutor correctly argued that the letter should be admitted into
evidence at the criminal trial. The Authors then provide a history of Rule
104(b), discuss common applications of the rule, and present a guide for
practitioners on how to conduct a Rule 104(b) analysis.
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INTRODUCTION
How could a prosecutor ever hope to introduce into evidence the
contents of a letter that no one can testify was ever sent or read? A letter
that may have been the motive for a double-murder, or could just as
easily never have been mailed? This quandary is precisely what a
prosecutor faced several years ago in the murder trial of Mark Edwards.
Trial attorneys should understand the reasoning behind the trial judge’s
ruling because they will gain valuable insight into a deceptively
common evidentiary nuance: conditional relevance.
State v. Edwards1 was a domestic violence double-homicide trial
held in Anchorage in August 2002. Edwards was accused of murdering
his estranged ex-wife and her roommate. The prosecutor offered
1. State v. Edwards, No. 3AN-S99-1269 Cr. (Alaska Super. Ct. Aug. 22,
2002).
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evidence that, a few days before the murders, Edwards’ ex-wife wrote a
letter to Edwards in which she told him that she intended to leave him
and Alaska forever.
The prosecutor offered testimony from a woman—a close friend of
Mark Edwards’ ex-wife—who read the letter just days before the
murder. This witness testified that Edwards’ ex-wife had written the
letter and placed it in a stamped envelope, but had not decided whether
she would mail it. The prosecutor’s theory was that Edwards’ ex-wife
mailed the letter and that Edwards received it and read it. The
prosecutor argued that the letter angered Edwards and provided his
motive for the murders. But the prosecutor faced a daunting obstacle: no
witness could testify that Edwards’ ex-wife actually mailed the letter or
that Edwards actually received or read it.
Given these facts, how could a judge ever admit evidence of the
letter’s content? What evidence rule governs admissibility? What
threshold burden must the proponent sustain to trigger admissibility?
How should the judge rule? What findings must a judge make to protect
the case from appellate mischief and the specter of reversal? This Article
discusses the answers to these questions, which are found in the liberal
threshold for admissibility of conditionally relevant evidence in Alaska
Rule of Evidence 104(b).
Seemingly obscure, Evidence Rule 104(b) is seldom cited in Alaska
street-crime prosecution practice. However, the rule applies to a
deceptively wide spectrum of evidentiary issues, many of which arise on
a daily basis in Alaska criminal jury trial practice. As this Article
explains, Rule 104(b)’s minimal threshold standard—“evidence
sufficient to support a finding”—applies to disputed prosecution motive
evidence, disputed Rule 404(b) acts, and a defendant’s disputed
admissions. Criminal trial attorneys frequently encounter all of these
situations.
One would think that criminal practitioners—especially
prosecutors—would have Rule 104(b) “in their back pocket.” One would
think that trial judges would be as familiar with Rule 104(b) as they are
with the law of hearsay exceptions. But, in the Authors’ opinion, this is
not the case.2
Part I of this Article discusses the Edwards trial, which provides a
compelling example of conditional relevance and an application of

2. When Author James Fayette told a very experienced prosecution
colleague recently that this Article would focus on Evidence Rule 104(b), the
colleague quipped, “Evidence Rule 104(b)? Who ever cites to that rule?” Another
experienced prosecutor said, “Your article will probably be read about half as
often as the rule is. Do the math . . .”
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Evidence Rule 104(b). Part II analyzes the doctrine of conditional
relevance, explains the rule’s relationship to other evidentiary rules, and
provides a practitioner’s practical, step-by-step guide to using the rule.
Part III discusses Rule 104(b)’s common trial applications.

I. MARK EDWARDS’ TRIAL
A.

Factual Background3

In November 1998, Mona Edwards filed for divorce from her
husband, Mark, a man with a history of substance abuse and violent
behavior. Mona moved out of the couple’s small house in the Fairview
area of Anchorage, and moved in with a friend, Maela Crabtree.
Crabtree’s home was located a few miles away from Fairview in
Anchorage’s Spenard neighborhood. Mark and Mona saw each other
periodically in the weeks following the divorce filing. Mark wanted to
reconcile; Mona did not.
On December 15, 1998, Mark spoke with Mona in the driveway of
Maela’s home. They argued after Mona refused to take a walk with
Mark. Mark pushed Mona down on the driveway, spat at her, raised his
hand, and extended his thumb and forefinger in an “L” shape.
Ominously, Mark pointed his index finger at Mona and said “pop!,” as if
he had pulled the trigger on a gun, and then walked away.
That evening, Mona drove to the Anchorage courthouse with her
close friend, Arlene Sanchez, to seek an emergency restraining order
against Mark. Following a hearing, the order was issued and Mona and
Arlene returned to Arlene’s house in East Anchorage where they sat and
talked. As they talked, Mona produced a letter from her pocketbook.
Arlene later testified that Mona showed her a handwritten letter folded
inside an unsealed envelope addressed to Mark at his Fairview address.4
The envelope was stamped. Mona handed Arlene the completed letter
and asked her to read it.

3. Author James Fayette was the Edwards trial prosecutor. Except where
otherwise indicated, all information contained in the section on Mark Edwards’
trial is derived from the Author’s firsthand experience and from the Edwards
trial transcript (Transcript of Record, State v. Edwards, No. 3AN-S99-1269 Cr.
(Alaska Super. Ct. Aug. 22, 2002) (on file with the Alaska Law Review)
[hereinafter “Trial Transcript”]).
4. Other trial evidence established that Mark received mail at the Fairview
address. When police searched his house after the murders, they photographed
other delivered mail at his house to prove that he was the resident. But police
did not look for, or find, Mona’s December 15th letter.
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Arlene testified that Mona told Mark in the letter that she “hoped
he would get on with his life and be happy, and to leave her alone, and
to let her go.” Mona wrote that she was leaving Alaska and returning to
her family on the East Coast, and that she would stop paying the
insurance for Mark’s truck at the end of the month—barely two weeks
away. Arlene testified that Mona closed the letter by telling Mark “she
wanted [her] gun back.”5
Arlene and her daughter both advised Mona that she should not
mail the letter because they were afraid that it would anger Mark.
Arlene testified that Mona did not say that she had decided to send the
letter, but Mona did not say that she had decided against sending it,
either.6
Three days later, on the evening of Friday, December 18th, Mark
Edwards drove to Mona and Maela’s home with a .22 caliber, two-shot
Derringer—the same weapon that witnesses said Mark bought for Mona
years earlier. When Maela answered the door, Mark forced his way
inside and shot Maela once in the face, killing her. Mark then locked the
front door from the inside and walked down to Mona’s basement
bedroom, where Mona was asleep. Mark shot Mona once in the head,
killing her. Mark then re-loaded his Derringer and shot himself once in
the head. The final bullet caused brain damage and severed his optic
nerve but, incredibly, he survived.

5. Trial Transcript, supra note 3, at 1716. Other witnesses identified the
weapon Mona referred to as a two-shot .22 caliber Derringer. Witnesses testified
that Mark purchased the gun for Mona years earlier. When the couple separated,
Mona left the gun with Mark. Before the divorce, Mark—unknown to Mona—
loaned the gun to a friend. None of Mona’s statements in the letter, as related by
Arlene, constituted objectionable hearsay because the prosecution did not offer
evidence of the letter’s contents for the truth of what Mona wrote. See ALASKA R.
EVID. 801(c) (hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of
the matter asserted). Mona’s writings were only offered to prove the effect of the
statement on the recipient, Mark. The letter was offered to prove Mark’s motive.
Mona’s statements were relevant not because they were true, but because they
were uttered. To the extent that any of the statements could be construed as
hearsay, they would still have been admissible as statements of Mona’s thenexisting state of mind (Mona’s intent to leave Alaska; her hope that Mark would
be happy; her intent to stop insurance payments; and her desire to get her gun
back). See ALASKA R. EVID. 803(3).
6. Arlene Sanchez testified, “Well, Mona was always slow with her
reactions . . . . But she looked at me and she goes ‘do you think[?]’ And I said,
‘Yes, that I think you shouldn’t mail it’. . . . I do not know positively for sure that
she mailed it, no. . . . She didn’t—she didn’t acknowledge the fact that I said that
that’s what I wanted her to do, and she did not tell me that she was not going to
mail it. She didn’t tell me. She left around 2:00 a.m. in the morning. . . . [w]ith the
letter . . . . I think my daughter put it back in the envelope. . . . [S]he was the last
one to read it.” Trial Transcript, supra note 3, at 1717–18.
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The next day, friends became alarmed when both Mona and Maela
failed to make scheduled appointments and did not answer the
telephone. Friends summoned police, who eventually broke into the
house and discovered the two women’s bodies. They also found Mark
Edwards, severely wounded but alive, in the basement near his exwife’s body.7
In the course of their investigation, the police interviewed
Edwards’ friend—the man with whom Mark had left Mona’s Derringer.
This friend testified that Edwards arrived at his house on Thursday
evening, December 17th, and asked for the Derringer back. The friend
testified that Edwards did not say why he wanted it, but that he gave
the gun to Edwards. The prosecution’s theory was that less than twentyfour hours later Mark Edwards used this very weapon to commit a
double-murder and attempted suicide.
At Edwards’ trial, the prosecutor offered Arlene Sanchez’s
testimony about the contents of Mona’s letter. The prosecutor argued
that strong circumstantial evidence showed Mona had, in fact, mailed
the letter. The prosecutor argued that if Mona had mailed the letter on
Wednesday after she left Arlene’s house at 2:00 a.m., it might well have
been delivered within one day—sometime on Thursday. If so, according
to the prosecutor, this would explain why Mark asked his friend to
return the Derringer that evening and why he used it to kill Mona the
next day. The defense lawyer objected to the offer as speculative. No one
saw Mona mail the letter. No one could testify that Mark read it. Why
was it relevant? The defense lawyer argued,
[H]ere we have . . . basically [prosecution] conjecture that Mona
Edwards mailed this letter. . . . [Arlene] does not know whether
it was mailed or not . . . . The letter was never found at Mark’s
house. It was never found in his truck. . . . [I]f you are going to
say [the letter] has any relevance at all you have to show that
he received it. And that’s just pure conjecture.8

7. The Edwards prosecution had an extended pre-trial procedural history.
The case triggered a three-year long series of competency hearings before Judge
Andrews. Judge Andrews eventually ruled that Edwards was competent to
stand trial. Edwards’ trial commenced in August 2002. An account of the
competency aspect of the case is beyond the scope of this Article.
8. Trial Transcript, supra note 3, at 1520–21. The prosecutor responded that
the reason the police never found the letter was obvious—they had not
interviewed Arlene Sanchez yet, and thus had no reason to look for the letter.
Additionally, the police did not think that Mark Edwards was going to survive
his self-inflicted gunshot wound. When the police searched Mark’s house, they
were primarily interested in locating addresses and telephone numbers for his
next-of-kin.
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The prosecutor responded, and characterized the issue as a one of
conditional relevance, governed by Rule 104(b):
THE COURT: What is the evidence that is sufficient to [support
the finding] that it was read, that it was received?. . . .
[THE PROSECUTOR]: I want my gun back?. . . . That’s huge. I
want my gun back. Then, . . . within hours . . . for no other
reason, he’s going to his friend and saying I want that gun back.
That doesn’t ground a reasonable inference that the gun is
foremost in his mind[?] . . . [T]he same gun that’s noted in the
letter that was probably mailed on Wednesday and that he
could have read on Thursday? That’s a coincidence? A juror
acting reasonably couldn’t draw that connection? . . . You want
the gun back? [Then he] kills her with that gun on Friday night
or Saturday morning? A reasonable juror couldn’t draw the
connection between those events?9
At this point, however, Judge Andrews was not convinced. She
focused on the time required for the letter to be delivered to Edwards:
I think it’s hopeful that one would’ve gotten the mail that
[soon] . . . . even the court rule allows three days for mailing.10
So . . . it would have [had to have caught] the right number of
postal carts to have made it to his house so soon. I’m not saying
that it’s not possible, it certainly is possible. But it’s not more
likely than not that it came so quickly. . . . You’re missing the
piece for me that the letter could have actually reached there. I
mean, if you want to bring in someone from the post office
[who] says that something mailed between 1:00 a.m. and 3:00
a.m. in Anchorage could’ve been delivered . . . in the Thursday
mail . . . . I’m happy to be educated on the speed of our mail.11
Judge Andrews sustained the defense objection for the moment,
but she deferred final ruling until she heard testimony, outside the jury’s
presence, about Anchorage postal delivery times. Judge Andrews
allowed the prosecution to call U.S. Postal Service Anchorage
Administrator Jolene Carter to testify about delivery time for cross-town
Anchorage mail. Ms. Carter testified that cross-town Anchorage mail is
delivered within one day “always 95-plus percent” of the time.12 Ms.
Carter said that her testimony was based upon numerous external

9. Id. at 1527–28 (emphasis added).
10. See ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 40(d) (allowing three additional days to file a
response when a litigant serves an opponent by mail).
11. Trial Transcript, supra note 3, at 1523, 1531–32.
12. Id. at 1674.
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audits and U.S. Post Office quality control surveys with which she was
very familiar.13
After Ms. Carter’s credentials were established, the prosecutor
asked her a hypothetical question: Assume that a properly addressed
and stamped first class letter was mailed from an East Anchorage post
box (near Sanchez’ house) early in the day and addressed to a Fairview
neighborhood location (Edwards’ house). How long would it take for
the letter to arrive at the recipient’s address? Ms. Carter unequivocally
responded, “One day.”14
B.

Analysis of Admissibility of Testimony About the Letter’s
Content

With Carter’s testimony, the prosecutor referred Judge Andrews to
Rule 104(b) and the leading conditional relevance case—Huddleston v.
United States.15 The prosecution cited Rule 104(b) because the defense
objection to the admissibility of Mona’s letter was really a relevance
objection; the defense argued that the prosecution could not
conclusively establish that the letter was ever mailed, let alone that
Edwards received and read it. Therefore, the defense argued, testimony
about the letter’s contents was irrelevant: if Edwards was unaware of
the letter, it was impossible that the letter was his motive for the
murders.16
The prosecutor argued, however, that strong circumstantial
evidence suggested that the letter actually was mailed, received, and
read. The letter informed Mark that Mona intended to leave him for
good, that she would stop paying his car insurance, and that before she
left, she wanted her gun back. Thus, the letter was clear evidence of
Mark’s motive to kill his wife with the very gun she had asked him to
13. When Carter was asked to testify about her qualifications to offer an
opinion about Anchorage delivery times, she responded, “Well, . . . my job that I
have, I actually track that. I’m responsible for setting up the staffing and
scheduling in order to meet the goals and the deadlines of the Anchorage Postal
Service and meeting the delivery standards.” Id. at 1701–02.
14. Id. at 1702.
15. 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
16. Cf. Byrd v. State, 626 P.2d 1057, 1059 (Alaska 1980) (“[O]ne cannot be
fearful because of events about which one knows nothing.”); see also Smith v.
State, No. A-7964, 2004 WL 719993 at *4 n.5 (citing 2 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 389, at 417 (Chadbourn 1979) (“There is but one
limitation [on the admission of evidence of a person’s motive] that can be
thought of as necessary and universal, namely, [that] the circumstance said to
have excited the [person’s] emotion must be shown to have probably become
known to the person; because otherwise it could not have affected his
emotions.”)).
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return. The prosecutor argued that if the jury believed the letter was
mailed, received, and read, it could reasonably conclude that the letter
was evidence of Mark’s motive.
At Edwards’ trial, Rule 104(b) was the only evidentiary obstacle to
admission of testimony regarding the content of Mona’s letter. The
prosecution did not offer Mona’s letter to establish the truth of what
Mona wrote, so it was not hearsay.17 Mona’s letter, which would be
strong circumstantial evidence of the perpetrator’s identity, constituted
powerful motive evidence in the context of a domestic violence
homicide.18 Therefore, admission of testimony regarding the letter’s
contents satisfied Evidence Rules 401 and 402.19 Further, Evidence Rule
403 would not block admission of testimony about Mona’s letter, as
testimony about the letter was not “unfairly prejudicial” to Mark
Edwards.20 According to Arlene Sanchez, Mona’s letter did not contain
the vindictiveness one might expect in a “Dear John” letter. It did not
contain bitter accusations of any marital or criminal misconduct.
Testimony about the letter also would not confuse trial issues or
constitute a distracting waste of time. In fact, Mona’s letter was evidence
that she still cared for Edwards. That fact might have “prejudiced” Mark
Edwards in the sense that a juror might conclude that he killed a caring
woman in cold blood, but that inference is not the sort of “unfair”
prejudice against which Rule 403 protects.
Therefore, the issue was framed: Judge Andrews was confronted
with a classic issue of conditional relevancy. If the letter was mailed,
received, and read, it was relevant. If not, then it was irrelevant. If Rule
104(b) was satisfied, the prosecutor’s evidence would be admissible.

17. See supra note 5.
18. Identity was actually contested at Edwards’ trial. The defense argued
that a sloppy police investigation focused too quickly on Edwards, who had
been arrested inside a locked house with the bodies of two murdered women.
The defense lawyers hypothesized that an unknown mystery killer could have
shot Mona, Maela, and Mark, and then escaped into thin air. The defense lawyer
argued in summation, “[W]e know there was a fourth person there. . . .” Trial
Transcript, supra note 3, at 2032.
19. See ALASKA R. EVID. 401 (defining relevance; evidence is relevant if it
makes existence of a disputed fact (e.g., the identity of the perpetrator) more
probable than it would be without that evidence); ALASKA R. EVID. 402 (“All
relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided by [law]”).
20. See ALASKA R. EVID. 403 (stating that relevant evidence may be excluded
if it is unfairly prejudicial, confuses the issues, or constitutes a waste of time). As
is often the case with evidence of this sort, the attorneys’ argument over the
letter, outside the jury’s presence, consumed far more time than the actual trial
testimony on the point.
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Judge Andrews’ Ruling

In the midst of Edwards’ trial, the prosecutor argued in favor of
admitting the letter:
[T]he question is can a reasonable fact finder find by a
preponderance that the predicate condition has been met; in
this case—that the letter was sent and received. And as I
conceded, the State’s proof is circumstantial, but . . . it is
reasonable to infer that if mailed early on Wednesday, there’s a
substantial chance . . . that the mail would have been received
at a residential address, cross-town-mail, on Thursday. And
then, when one combines that with the other circumstances we
know, . . . Mr. Edwards, out of the blue, seeking out [his friend]
on Thursday night to retrieve the gun that’s mentioned in the
letter, a reasonable . . . juror could find, by a preponderance, . . .
that the predicate facts have been established by a
preponderance. . . .
The prosecutor and the judge then had the following exchange:
[THE PROSECUTOR]: So, I need not repeat or drone on about
the circumstances . . .
THE COURT: No.
[THE PROSECUTOR]: . . . but . . . she wrote the letter, she
said . . .
THE COURT: Got it. Got it.
[THE PROSECUTOR]: . . . she was going to mail it.
THE COURT: Got it. Got it.
[THE PROSECUTOR]: She addressed it, she . . .
THE COURT: Got it.
[THE PROSECUTOR]: . . . stamped it, and we’ve got the . . .
THE COURT: Got it. Got it.
[THE PROSECUTOR]: . . . occurrences on Thursday night.21
THE COURT: Got it. Got it.
[THE PROSECUTOR]: Thank you, Judge.22
Judge Andrews then ruled:
[W]hat we have here, and that’s why I’m asking for the
information from the post office, is the [S]tate’s going to bring
in testimony to say a letter was written, stamped envelope,
ready to go. I don’t think the [S]tate needs to prove that it was,
in fact, mailed. I think there’s circumstantial evidence that the
21. Mark retrieved the gun from his friend on Thursday night.
22. Trial Transcript, supra note 3, at 1686–88.
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person had the intent to mail it. And then, the question for me
was, well, is there evidence to show that if the letter was
mailed, that it could’ve gotten there in the time frame that the
[S]tate is talking about[?]. . . . And I think that this does make
that connection. In other words, if she mailed it, it could’ve
gotten there. . . . [W]ith the testimony from this post office
person, the answer is, it could’ve gotten there. . . . [S]he
could’ve mailed it and it could have gotten there. It’s up to the
jury to decide how much weight to give that. . . . [I]t’s
admissible.23
With this ruling, Judge Andrews allowed Jolene Carter to testify
before the trial jury about the timing of mail delivery in Anchorage. She
then allowed Arlene Sanchez to testify about the contents of Mona’s
letter. In summation, the prosecutor argued that when Mona Edwards
mailed her letter, she essentially signed her own death warrant.24

II. ADMISSIBILITY OF CONDITIONALLY RELEVANT EVIDENCE
ANALYZED: RULE-BY-RULE, STEP-BY-STEP
A.

Commonly Encountered Conditional Relevance Examples

The issue that Judge Andrews encountered in the Edwards trial may
seem novel, but conditional relevance is a deceptively common
evidentiary issue. The issue is encountered almost daily in criminal trial
practice, though only rarely will busy criminal practitioners and trial
judges expressly invoke Rule 104(b) or frame an issue using the rule’s
terms. The following examples provide illustrations of how frequently
criminal practitioners encounter conditional relevance issues.


A prosecutor offers a document and asserts that the
document is a letter written by the defendant, in which the
defendant makes damning admissions that he committed
a crime. The prosecution offers a lay witness who will
testify that he is familiar with the defendant’s handwriting,
and, in his opinion, the letter was really written by the
defendant. The defense attorney objects and explains that
an expert document examiner will testify that the letter is
really a forgery.25

23. Id. at 1691–92.
24. Id. at 2002.
25. This elegant example of how conditional relevance applies to
authentication issues is drawn directly from EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, 5
EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS § 4.01 (2002). It also resonates with an example cited
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In a domestic violence prosecution, the prosecutor offers
evidence from the battered spouse that the defendant hit
her on a previous occasion. The defendant objects, arguing
that the prior episode was never reported to police and did
not result in a court conviction. “Judge, how do we know
what really happened on that prior occasion?”
In a drug trafficking prosecution, the defendant is charged
with possession of drugs and paraphernalia that were
found in his backpack. At arrest, the defendant tells police
that the backpack belonged to another person. The
prosecutor offers evidence that the defendant, on a prior
occasion, was arrested with crack pipes and cocaine
paraphernalia. The prosecutor argues that the prior
episode establishes the defendant’s knowledge of what
street drugs look like and rebuts the defense of innocent,
unknowing possession. The defense attorney objects,
arguing that the district attorney dismissed the prior
criminal charge: “Judge, this is sandbagging. If the DA
dismissed the charges back then, how are we supposed to
figure out what really happened now?”
In a homicide prosecution, the prosecutor offers evidence
that the defendant had a motive to kill the decedent. The
prosecutor offers to prove, circumstantially, that the
defendant was aware of animosity between the decedent
and the defendant’s friends. The defense lawyer objects,
and argues, “Judge, the prosecutor is just wildly
speculating. How can they hope to establish what my
client was really thinking?”

Although not explicitly stated, each of these trial objections is based
upon conditional relevance principles and is governed by Rule 104(b).
Under this rule, if the proponent of the evidence can establish that a
factual issue is “reasonably debatable,” the issue must be submitted to
the jury.26 The primary signal that an opponent is invoking a conditional

in the Commentary to Alaska’s rule. “[I]f a letter purporting to be from Y is
relied upon to establish an admission by him, it has no probative value unless Y
wrote or authorized it.” COMMENTARY TO THE ALASKA R. EVID. 104(b).
26. See Morgan v. State, 54 P.3d 332, 336–37 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002) (equating
Rule 104(b)’s “evidence sufficient to support a finding” standard with the term
“reasonably debatable”); see also Smith v. State, No. A-7964, 2004 WL 719993, at
*5 (Alaska Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2004) (discussing a judge’s “duty” to submit
reasonably debatable factual issues to the jury).
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relevance objection is often the opponent’s invocation of the word
“really.”27
Thus, the question may be framed as follows: What quantum of
proof must the proponent marshal to convince the judge to allow the
jury to hear the evidence on the disputed point?
B.

Step-by-Step Analysis Under Rule 104(b)

The relevance of disputed trial evidence will frequently depend on
the proponent’s “fulfillment” of a preliminary fact,28 which is to say that
it must be proven to be true. If a preliminary fact is proven, then the
disputed evidence is probably relevant and should be admitted for the
jury’s consideration. On the other hand, if a preliminary fact is not
proven, then the disputed evidence is irrelevant. This situation is the
reason this concept is described as “conditional” relevance: the
“condition” is the proponent’s fulfillment of a preliminary fact.29
An opponent will often point to contradictory evidence, or a benign
alternative explanation, and argue that the dispute itself renders denial
of admission of testimony about the event indisputable. But, as the
commentary to the Alaska Rules of Evidence recognizes, disputed issues
of fact are the reason the court is holding a jury trial, and disputed facts
are resolved by juries—not by judges.30
A leading commentator has described a judge’s role in the
conditional relevance context as one of “limited screening.”31 A judge
does not weigh credibility;32 he looks only to a proponent’s evidence, not
to an opponent’s countervailing evidence.33 In fact, the Alaska Court of
Appeals has gone a step further and stated that a judge is required to
view a proponent’s evidence in the light most favorable to the
proponent.34 The judge is not required to find that a proponent has

27. The objection will often sound like this: “Judge, how do we know if that
really happened?” or “How do we know if that (assertion, document, anecdote)
is really genuine?”
28. COMMENTARY TO THE ALASKA R. EVID. 104(b).
29. See id.
30. Id. (“If preliminary questions of conditional relevancy were determined
solely by the judge . . . the functioning of the jury as a trier of fact would be
greatly restricted and in some cases virtually destroyed. Relevance questions are
appropriate questions for juries.”).
31. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 25, at § 4.01 (“[T]he judge initially plays a
limited, screening role, and the jury then makes the final decision on the
question of fact.”).
32. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 690 (1988).
33. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 25, at § 4.01.
34. See Smith v. State, No. A-7964, 2004 WL 719993, at *5 (Alaska Ct. App.
Mar. 31, 2004) (holding that when reasonable jurors viewed the evidence at issue

FAYETTE BUSALACCHI_CPCXNS.DOC

184

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

12/11/2009 3:17:07 PM

VOL. 26:2

actually proven a preliminary fact by a preponderance.35 In fact, there is
no requirement that the judge actually believe the proponent’s
evidence.36 A judge merely asks whether a juror, acting reasonably,
could find the preliminary fact established. If so, the evidence is
admitted and the matter is submitted to the jury.
The Alaska Court of Appeals has explained that, where a
proponent presents evidence “sufficient to support a finding” that a
preliminary condition is fulfilled, the trial judge has a “duty” under
Alaska Rule of Evidence 104(b) to allow the proponent to offer its
evidence, so that a jury may decide the ultimate relevance of the
evidence.37
Therefore, when disputed preliminary facts seemingly constitute an
obstacle to admission of trial evidence, the step-by-step conditional
relevance roadmap is as follows:





Without weighing credibility of the sponsoring witnesses,
the judge must determine if the proponent has offered
evidence sufficient to support a finding that a preliminary
fact is established;38
The judge must next determine if the disputed evidence is
logically relevant to a disputed trial issue;39
The judge then must determine if admission of the
disputed evidence is barred by some other evidence rule,

in the light most favorable to the State they could conclude that the evidence
gave rise to motive).
35. See Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 690 (“In determining whether the Government
has introduced sufficient evidence to meet Rule 104(b), the trial court neither
weighs credibility nor makes a finding that the Government has proved the
conditional fact by a preponderance of the evidence.”).
36. United States v. Maddox, 944 F.2d 1223, 1230 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that
a government witness, who thought that a defendant mouthed the words
"you’re dead" to her while she was on the stand, was properly allowed to testify
about the threat even though the trial judge subjectively believed that the
witness had misinterpreted the defendant’s gesture). The court stated, “There is
no general rule that a judge must believe evidence to be true prior to allowing
evidence in. Rule 104(b) applies only to the situation where the relevancy of
evidence depends on the truth of a fact other than the truth of the evidence
being introduced. Otherwise, Rule 104(b) would require the trial judge to make
factual findings regarding every piece of evidence introduced at trial.” Id.
37. Smith, 2004 WL 719993, at *5. The court stated that, “[B]ecause the State’s
evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the necessary condition
(Smith’s awareness of the conflict) was fulfilled, it was the trial judge’s duty
under Evidence Rule 104(b) to allow the State to offer its evidence, so that the
jurors could decide the issue of fact that would determine the ultimate relevance
of the State’s evidence.”
38. See ALASKA R. EVID. 104(b).
39. See ALASKA R. EVID. 401; ALASKA R. EVID. 402.
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such as the rule barring impermissible character
evidence;40
The judge must next determine if admission of the relevant
evidence is barred by principles of “unfair prejudice” or
waste of time;41
Finally, upon an opponent’s request, a judge should give a
limiting jury instruction regarding the proper use of the
evidence, reminding the jury that it is their task to
determine whether the predicate fact has been proven.42

This step-by-step approach is consistent with the Alaska cases
Bennett v. Municipality43 and Ayagarak v. State,44 discussed below.
C.

Rule 104(b) and Huddleston

Alaska Rule of Evidence 104(b) governs preliminary questions of
relevancy. The rule provides: “When the relevancy of evidence depends
upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon,
or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding
of the fulfillment of the condition.”45 The commentary to this rule
explains:
It frequently happens that two or more controverted facts are
so related that evidence of one is inadmissible without
evidence of one or more of the others. Thus when a spoken
statement is relied upon to prove notice to X, it is without
probative value unless X heard it. Or if a letter purporting to be
from Y is relied upon to establish an admission by him, it has
no probative value unless Y wrote or authorized it. Relevance
in this sense has been labeled “conditional relevancy. . . .” In
the case of conditional relevance, . . . [t]he judge makes a
preliminary determination whether the foundation evidence is
sufficient to support a finding of fulfillment of the condition. If
40. See ALASKA R. EVID. 404(b).
41. See ALASKA R. EVID. 403.
42. Wyatt v. State, No. 3607, 1997 WL 250441, at *4 (Alaska Ct. App. May 14,
1997), aff’d, 981 P.2d 109 (Alaska 1999).
43. 205 P.3d 1113, 1117 (Alaska Ct. App. 2009). 404(b)(4) evidence must still
be relevant under Rule 402, and is also subject to Rule 403 exclusion; see also
Smith v. State, No. A-7964, 2004 WL 719993 (Alaska Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2004)
(analyzing disputed motive evidence first under Rule 104(b), and finally under
Rule 403, as discussed below).
44. No. A-8066, 2003 WL 1922623, at *4 (Alaska Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2003)
(outlining analysis under Rule 104(b), then Rule 402, then Rule 403, and finally a
Rule 105 instruction).
45. ALASKA R. EVID. 104(b).
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so, the item is admitted. If after all the evidence on the issue is
in, pro and con, the jury could reasonably conclude either that
fulfillment of the condition is or is not established, the issue is
for them . . . . If preliminary questions of conditional relevancy
were determined solely by the judge . . . the functioning of the
jury as a trier of fact would be greatly restricted and in some
cases virtually destroyed. Relevance questions are appropriate
questions for juries.46
In the Edwards trial, the prosecutor referred Judge Andrews to
Huddleston v. United States.47 Huddleston was prosecuted for possession
of a trailer full of stolen videocassettes.48 At trial, there was no question
that the videocassettes were, in fact, stolen; rather, “the only material
issue at trial was whether petitioner knew they were stolen.”49 The
prosecution offered “other acts” evidence under Rule 404(b) to prove
that Huddleston previously possessed stolen television sets and other
appliances, thereby establishing Huddleston’s knowledge that the
videos had been stolen; however, Huddleston was never convicted of
the prior acts.50 Huddleston testified that he had acquired the television
sets and other appliances legitimately.51 Writing for a unanimous Court,
Chief Justice Rehnquist explained,
In determining whether the Government has introduced
sufficient evidence to meet Rule 104(b), the trial court neither
weighs credibility nor makes a finding that the Government
has proved the conditional fact by a preponderance of the
evidence. The court simply examines all the evidence in the case and
decides whether the jury could reasonably find the conditional fact—

46. COMMENTARY TO THE ALASKA R. EVID. 104(b). The Alaska Supreme Court
“has [neither] adopted [n]or approved” the Commentary to the Rules of
Evidence. See COMMENTARY TO THE ALASKA R. EVID., “Introduction.” As the
Alaska Court of Appeals recently noted, “the commentaries to the various
evidence rules represent only the views of the Evidence Rules’ main drafter,
Professor Stephen A. Saltzburg, and not necessarily the views or the intentions
of our supreme court.” Tsen v. State, 176 P.3d 1, 8 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008).
However, Alaska courts have long recognized the official commentary as
persuasive. See, e.g., Spenard Action Comm. v. Lot 3, Block 1, Evergreen
Subdivision, 902 P.2d 766, 780 (Alaska 1995).
47. 485 U.S. 681, 690 (1988).
48. Id. at 682.
49. Id. at 683.
50. Id.
51. Id. In fact, the Government’s proof to the contrary seemed less than
compelling. “[T]he government’s only support for the assertion that the
televisions were stolen was [petitioner’s] failure to produce a bill of sale at trial
and the fact that the televisions were sold at a low price.” Id. at 682.
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here, that the televisions were stolen—by a preponderance of the
evidence.52
Against this background, it is clear that Judge Andrews’ ruling in
the Edwards case was correct. Judge Andrews made no finding
regarding the credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses. She made no
finding that Mona’s letter was sent or received. Judge Andrews simply
concluded that the proponent’s evidence was sufficient to support a
finding by the jury, by preponderance, that the letter was sent, received,
read, and provided a motive for Mark Edwards to murder his wife and
her friend. Having made this finding, she submitted the evidence to the
jury and allowed them to decide if Mona’s letter triggered the murders
or not.
D.

Historical Development of the Rule

Rule 104(b) embodies a principle that lies at the heart of the modern
jury system—that our legal system entrusts juries, not judges, with the
task of deciding disputed facts. Yet the rules of evidence reflect legal
professionals’ historic distrust of juries. The oft-expressed concern is that
average citizens, untrained in the law, are too naïve to sift through
unreliable data or to resist the temptation to decide cases based on
emotion or equities rather than the law. Thus, modern evidentiary and
procedural rules exclude entire categories of information from a jury’s
consideration because legal professionals deem such evidence to be too
prejudicial, unreliable, or contrary to public policy.53
This distrust of juries is reflected in the distinction between Rule
104(a) and Rule 104(b). Under Rule 104(a), judges, not juries, are asked
to decide legal questions regarding the admissibility of trial evidence.
Judges decide whether a questioned communication is protected from
disclosure by privilege, whether someone is competent to be a witness,
or whether a hearsay exception applies to certain testimony.54 These are
legal conclusions entrusted to judges. On the other hand, Rule 104(b)
52. Id. at 690 (emphasis added).
53. See ALASKA R. EVID. 404(a) (character evidence); ALASKA R. EVID. 801
(hearsay); ALASKA R. EVID. 503–509 (privilege); see also John Leubsdorf,
Presuppositions of Evidence Law, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1209, 1251 (2006) (discussing
juror distrust in light of modern rules restricting admissibility of hearsay,
character evidence, existence of insurance coverage, and settlement offers);
Edward J. Imwinkelreid, An Evidentiary Paradox: Defending the Character Evidence
Prohibition by Upholding a Non-Character Theory of Logical Relevance, The Doctrine of
Chances, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 419, 427 (2006) (arguing that jurors might convict
based upon derogatory character evidence to protect society, rather than upon a
finding that guilt was proven beyond a reasonable doubt).
54. See COMMENTARY TO THE ALASKA R. EVID. 104(a).
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represents the alternate proposition: where admissibility depends on the
connection of two or more facts, the judge decides only whether a jury
could reasonably make a rational connection between the facts.
A detailed history of the drafting, adoption, and promulgation of
the Alaska Rules of Evidence is beyond the scope of this Article, but a
brief description may be helpful. Following the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence in 1975, then-Chief Justice Rabinowitz invited
Professor Stephen Saltzburg to draft a proposed evidence code for
Alaska state courts.55
In late 1976, Professor Saltzburg submitted a draft of proposed
evidence rules, which was disseminated for Bar comment. The supreme
court appointed an evidence rules advisory committee that met during
1977 and 1978. The advisory committee considered Bar comments, and
ultimately submitted a proposed evidence code to the Alaska Supreme
Court, along with commentary drafted by Professor Saltzburg.56
Although the committee received considerable comment regarding
some of the proposed rules, Rule 104(b) drew no comment and no
controversy.57 After making its own revisions, the supreme court voted
on the proposed evidence rules one by one, and adopted Alaska’s rules
of evidence. The rules became effective on August 1, 1979.58
Professor Saltzburg’s commentary to the evidence rules is
traditionally published in the Alaska Rules of Court handbook,59 and
appears on the state court website.60 While the commentary has never
been formally adopted by the Alaska Supreme Court, it is regarded as
persuasive.61 Professor Saltzburg’s commentary on Rule 104(b) is
essentially identical to the Advisory Committee Notes for the analogous
federal evidence rule—citing to the same provisions of the Uniform

55. Transcript of an address by Prof. Saltzburg to the Alaska Judicial
Conference, Anchorage, Alaska (Dec. 16–17, 1976) at 2 (on file with the Alaska
Law Review).
56. Report to the Alaska Supreme Court by the Committee on the Rules of
Evidence (undated) (on file with the Alaska Law Review).
57. Alaska Court System Court Rules historical files; Supreme Court Order
364, documents drawer (available by appointment with the Court System Rules
Attorney); Alaska Court System, Snowden Administration Building, 820 4th
Avenue, Anchorage, Alaska.
58. Supreme Court Order 364, effective August 1, 1979.
59. ALASKA RULES OF COURT HANDBOOK (2009 ed.).
60. See ALASKA RULES OF EVIDENCE, available at http://www.state.ak.us/
courts/ev.htm.
61. COMMENTARY TO THE ALASKA R. EVID., “Introduction”; see also supra note
46.
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Rules, sister state evidence codes, and writings by Professor Edmund
Morgan.62
Thus, the origins of Alaska’s conditional relevance rule extend far
beyond the adoption of Alaska’s evidence code in 1979. The modern
development of the conditional relevance principle dates from an early
twentieth century case, Gila Valley, Globe & Northern Railway Co. v. Hall. 63
In that case, a workman was injured while riding along railroad tracks
in a three-wheeled gasoline car provided by the rail company for his
transportation as he measured the company’s tracks.64 While taking a
turn, a wheel from the railcar came loose, causing the plaintiff to be
thrown from the car onto the tracks, where he was run over.65 He
suffered serious injuries and sued the railroad for damages, alleging that
the company was negligent and that the car’s defect could have been
found through reasonable inspection.66 The trial court found in Hall’s
favor and the railroad appealed, contending that the court improperly
refused to admit testimony that indicated the plaintiff may have
overheard people discussing the wheel’s defective appearance.67 This
testimony would have been relevant evidence because it would have
negated the plaintiff’s claim that he had not assumed the risk when
riding in the car.68 The defendant railroad wanted the testimony
admitted with the instruction that if the jury believed the plaintiff heard
the conversation, they could take that fact into consideration when
deciding whether the plaintiff had assumed the risk.69
The Supreme Court held against the defendant, stating:
We agree that the testimony was such as to render it a matter of
doubtful inference whether Hall heard the conversation; but
we think this question of fact was one to be determined by the
trial court, and not by the jury. Questions of the admissibility of
evidence are for the determination of the court; and this is so

62. FED. R. EVID. 104(b) advisory committee’s notes (citing EDMUND MORGAN,
BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 45–46 (1962) and CAL. EVID. CODE § 403).
63. 232 U.S. 94, 100 (1914). The phrase “conditional relevance” never appears
in the Gila Valley opinion, but most commentators agree that the modern
development of this rule begins with a discussion of this opinion. See Norman
M. Garland, An Essay On: Of Judges and Juries Revisited in the Context of Certain
Preliminary Fact Questions Determining the Admissibility of Evidence Under Federal
and California Rules of Evidence, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 853, 854 n.8 (2008) (tracing the
academic authority surrounding the rule’s historical development).
64. Gila Valley, 232 U.S. at 97.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 97–98.
67. Id. at 102.
68. Id. at 100.
69. Id. at 101.
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whether its admission depend[s] upon matter of law or upon
matter of fact.70
This facet of the Gila Valley opinion foreshadowed the modern
distinction between admissibility based upon a disputed legal principle,
which is now governed by Rule 104(a), and admissibility based upon a
disputed factual issue, which is governed by Rule 104(b).71
The principle expressed in the Gila Valley opinion—that a judge,
not a jury, decides relevance questions regardless of their legal or factual
basis—did not create uniformity for relevance decisions on this point.72
In fact, writing fifteen years after Gila Valley, Professor Edmund Morgan
expressed discomfort with the wildly inconsistent practice in state courts
on this point.73
In a seminal article on the topic, Professor Morgan drew a
distinction between admissibility based on legal principles, which he
called “competency,” and admissibility based on a disputed fact, which
we refer to today as conditional relevancy.74 Morgan explained: “In
theory, then, where the relevancy of A depends upon the existence of B,
the existence of B should normally be for the jury; where the competency
of A depends on the existence of B; the existence of B should always be
for the judge.”75

70. Id. at 103.
71. The commentary to Alaska Rule of Evidence 104(b) includes an example
that is notably similar to the Gila Valley facts. “[W]hen a spoken statement is
relied upon to prove notice to X, it is without probative value unless X heard it.”
COMMENTARY TO THE ALASKA R. EVID. 104(b). As we have seen, the commentary
then explains that conditionally relevant facts are to be submitted to the jury.
The inclusion of this example proves that the drafters clearly rejected the Gila
Valley result. One might now argue that had Gila Valley been decided in 2009,
rather than 1914, the outcome would have been completely different.
72. Compare Coghlan v. White, 236 Mass. 165, 167–68 (1920) (“It is the
province of the judge, who presides at the trial, to decide all questions on the
admissibility of evidence. It is also his province to decide any preliminary
questions of fact, however intricate, the solution of which may be necessary to
enable him to determine the other question of admissibility . . . ”) with Hite v.
Aydlett, 134 S.E. 419, 421 (N.C. 1926) (holding that the jury, rather than the
judge, could decide if the contract was in writing). For further elaboration on
this point, see John Maguire & Charles Epstein, Preliminary Questions of Fact in
Determining the Admissibility of Evidence, 40 HARV. L. REV. 392 (1927).
73. Edmund Morgan, Functions of the Judge and Jury in the Determination of
Preliminary Questions of Fact, 43 HARV. L. REV. 165, 170 (1929).
74. Id. at 171 (noting that the admissibility of a piece of evidence “depend[s]
on its relevancy”).
75. Id. at 169 (emphasis added).
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The standard that Morgan articulated in 1929 foreshadowed the
modern distinction between Evidence Rules 104(a) and 104(b).76 Under
Rule 104(a), a judge rules on the competence of witnesses, the
application of privilege, the application of hearsay exceptions, the
existence of co-conspirator statements, the exclusion of involuntary
statements, and the sufficiency of a Miranda warning.77 Thus, Rule
104(a) governs the court’s resolution of disputed legal issues. Rule
104(b), however, governs factual controversies. Under Rule 104(b), the
judge submits the evidence to the jury when there is a factual dispute
that could be resolved in either party’s favor. In other words, if the
relevance of proffered evidence depends on a disputed factual issue, the
judge merely determines whether the issue is “reasonably debatable.”78
If it is, the judge submits the matter to the jury for its decision.79
Professor Morgan also addressed the practical reasons why judges,
not juries, should make preliminary legal rulings; his arguments are
now the rationale for Rule 104(a). Writing almost forty-five years before
the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Morgan explained
that it did not make sense to leave a ruling on a legal principle to the
jury.80 Morgan noted that “[i]t will not do to disregard realities,”81 and
he observed that even if a jury of lay people was competent to rule on
legal questions regarding admissibility, it is a near impossibility that the
jury members would be able to erase evidence from their minds should
they conclude it was legally inadmissible.82
76. See, e.g., IMWINKELREID, supra note 25, § 2.05(1); 1 HERBERT J. STERN &
STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, TRYING CASES TO WIN: EVIDENCE: WEAPONS FOR WINNING
491–528 (2000) (contrasting and explaining Rules 104(a) and 104(b)).
77. FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
78. Edmund Morgan, supra note 73, at 170 (“The judge does not require the
plaintiff, as a condition to its reception, to prove to him [the conditioning fact]. It
is sufficient for plaintiff to present evidence from which the jury might
reasonably so find.”).
79. Morgan v. State, 54 P.3d 332, 338 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002) (describing the
Rule 104(b) test as one of reasonable debate).
80. Edmund Morgan, supra note 73, at 170 (holding that if ruling regarding
application of privilege were left to juries, “[i]n many instances . . . the chief
objective of the exclusionary rule would be destroyed. Where the exclusion is
based on a policy of protection of an interest, nothing could be more absurd than
to violate the interest and then to instruct the jury to repair the damage by
disregarding the wrongfully extracted evidence. If a lawyer is compelled to
repeat in open court the confidential communications of his alleged client, and
the jury is told to disregard them in case they find the relationship exists, the
harm of disclosure is beyond remedy.”).
81. Id. at 168 (noting that because the jury already faces such obstacles as
“vile ventilation, inadequate acoustics and limited light,” they should not be
imposed with additional burdens).
82. Id. at 168–69 (“[T]o expect the unskilled minds of jurors to do so is little
short of ridiculous.”).
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In contrast, Morgan provided a variety of examples of what would
come to be known as conditional relevance, noting that when
admissibility turns on the determination of a particular fact, the decision
must be for the jury and not the judge.83 Morgan seemed particularly
troubled by the judge’s power to take away crucial fact-finding
functions from the jury.84

III. COMMON TRIAL APPLICATIONS
In the past twenty years, the Alaska Court of Appeals has relied on
conditional relevance principles several times to affirm admission of
evidence regarding proof of a defendant’s admissions, his commission
of Rule 404(b) prior acts, and his awareness of facts giving rise to the
motive to commit the crime. The following section examines some of
these cases.
A.

Disputed Motive Evidence

In the Edwards trial, the prosecutor offered Mona Edwards’ letter
because it was powerful motive evidence. Such disputed motive
evidence is conceptually identical to a case decided by the court of
appeals two years after the Edwards trial. In Smith v. State,85 the
defendant was charged with murder stemming from the execution-style
shooting of an unarmed man named William Hall.86 Smith shot Hall
several times at point-blank range and ran away.87 Fortunately, a police
officer was nearby and responded to citizens’ 911 calls within seconds.88
The officer tracked Smith through the snow, following the only set of
footprints leading away from the murder scene.89 The officer found
Smith in the woods several hundred yards from the murder scene,

83. Id. at 170.
84. Id. at 170–72 (“If the judge can determine such a matter, then by clever
manipulation he can remove almost any material issue from the field of the
jury.”).
85. Smith v. State, No. A-7964, 2004 WL 719993 (Alaska Ct. App. Mar. 31,
2004). Author James Fayette was the Smith trial prosecutor. This Article
examines many unreported Alaska appellate opinions. The Alaska Court of
Appeals has held that litigants may cite unpublished opinions for “whatever
persuasive power” the opinion may hold, but not as binding precedent. McCoy
v. State, 80 P.3d 757, 764 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002) (interpreting ALASKA R. APP. P.
214).
86. Smith, 2004 WL 719993, at *1.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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sitting on his jacket, changing his clothes, literally sitting on the murder
weapon.90
Despite the strength of the physical evidence linking Smith to
Hall’s murder, the prosecution also sought to prove that Smith had a
motive for the crime, since the two men appeared to be strangers.91 The
prosecution offered to prove that Smith was aware of Hall’s pending
divorce proceedings and that Hall had an antagonistic relationship with
two of Smith’s friends as a result of the divorce, arguing that this
knowledge could have provided him with a motive to kill Hall.92 Judge
Mannheimer explained:
Thus, the State’s evidence of motive was conditionally relevant:
it was relevant if the jurors inferred, from the circumstances,
that Smith was aware of the conflict between his friends and
William Hall. Of course, this inference was not ineluctable. But
the inference was a reasonable one—that is, reasonable jurors
(viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State)
could conclude that Smith was aware of the circumstance
(Fleury’s and Pamela Hall’s conflict with William Hall) that
might engender the motive proposed by the State. . . . Because
the State’s evidence was conditionally relevant, and because
the State’s evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the
necessary condition (Smith’s awareness of the conflict) was
fulfilled, it was the trial judge’s duty under Evidence Rule
104(b) to allow the State to offer its evidence, so that the jurors
could decide the issue of fact that would determine the
ultimate relevance of the State’s evidence: the issue of whether
Smith was aware of the proposed motivating circumstance—
the conflict between his friends and William Hall.93
Therefore, the Smith court affirmed the trial judge’s ruling that the
motive evidence was admissible, despite the fact that there was no direct
proof that the Hall divorce played a role in Smith’s motive.94
The Smith holding is consistent with McCormack v. State,95 where
the court of appeals once again held that that admissibility of Rule
404(b) motive evidence is governed by the same Rule 104(b) principle.96
The McCormack court affirmed admission of evidence that McCormack
committed two uncharged robberies during a crime spree to prove his
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at *1–2.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *4–6.
No. A-9870, 2008 WL 5352364 (Alaska Ct. App. Dec. 24, 2008).
Id. at *3–4.
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motive to commit a third robbery.97 The prosecution argued that
McCormack committed the robberies because of serious financial
difficulties.98 The court of appeals specifically rejected the defense’s
claim that the trial judge should have been required to find, by clear and
convincing evidence, that “the defendant actually committed” the
uncharged crimes.99 Rather, the court agreed that the prosecution had
offered sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that McCormack
had committed the uncharged offenses and that the trial judge properly
submitted the issue to the jury for its evaluation.100
B.

Disputed Statement of Defendant

The court of appeals applied the same Rule 104(b) standard in
Marino v. State.101 Marino was charged with murder and attempted
murder.102 At trial, the prosecution called a witness to testify that,
shortly before the murder, Marino boasted that he knew “what it felt
like to kill someone,” that “killing was a ‘rush’ like taking drugs,” that it
was “entertaining to watch someone begging for their life,” and that
when he said this, Marino laughed.103 Marino disputed that he made the
statements.104 He also claimed that if he made the statements, it was not
near the time of the charged murder.105 On cross-examination, the
witness equivocated about whether Marino actually made the statement
on the day of the murder or a few days earlier.106 Yet, the trial court
admitted the statement, and the court of appeals affirmed, relying upon
Rule 104(b).107 Judge Mannheimer concluded that because a reasonable
juror could find that Marino made the statement, the statement was
admissible, and the defense was free to argue its credibility before the
jury.108

97. Id. at *3.
98. Id. at *2.
99. Id. at *3. The 2008 McCormack court was presented with the issue as one
of plain error and waiver, because this argument was not squarely presented to
the trial judge. Id. However, the court approvingly cited and relied upon its 2003
Ayagarak opinion, infra note 113, reaffirming that opinion’s validity. McCormack,
2008 WL 5352364, at *3.
100. McCormack, 2008 WL 5352364, at *3.
101. 934 P.2d 1321, 1329–30 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
102. Id. at 1324.
103. Id. at 1325.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1329.
107. Id. at 1330.
108. Id.

FAYETTE BUSALACCHI_CPCXNS.DOC

2009

CONDITIONAL RELEVANCE

12/11/2009 3:17:07 PM

195

The converse of this principle also applies. In Alaska, a suspect’s
silence in the face of an accusation may sometimes be admissible as an
“adoptive admission.” In Bloomstrand v. State,109 the court held that
although a prosecutor may not comment on a defendant’s post-arrest
silence, he may offer proof of the defendant’s pre-arrest silence in the
face of an accusatory question.110 Such evidence often treads
dangerously close to impermissible comment on the defendant’s right to
silence.111 What if the defendant objects to a prosecution offer of
adoptive admission testimony and claims he was aware of his Miranda
rights and was exercising them? No Alaska case addresses the point, but
federal authority holds that the prosecution must prove the absence of
Miranda warnings under Rule 104(b) when offering testimony about the
defendant’s silence.112
C.

Other Relevant Acts and Prior Crimes: Rule 404(b)

1. Prior Domestic Violence Offenses
In Ayagarak v. State,113 the defendant was accused of assaulting his
wife.114 He defended himself at trial by claiming self-defense.115 In
response, the prosecution offered evidence that Ayagarak had assaulted
his wife on three prior occasions.116 Only one of the prior assaults had
resulted in a conviction.117 Of the two instances that did not result in a
conviction, Ayagarak claimed that in one he acted in self-defense, and
he denied the other event altogether.118 Yet, the court of appeals
affirmed the admission of the wife’s testimony about all three prior
109. 656 P.2d 584 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
110. Id. at 588 (holding that a murder defendant’s pre-trial failure to answer
employer’s question about why he did not call the police was admissible as an
adoptive admission by silence); see also Doisher v. State, 658 P.2d 119, 120
(Alaska 1983) (holding that an accused’s failure to speak in response to an
accusatory comment is admissible as an adoptive admission where “an innocent
man would in the situation and surrounding circumstances naturally respond”).
111. See Silvernail v. State, 777 P.2d 1169, 1177 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989)
(quoting People v. Conyers, 420 N.E.2d 933, 935 (N.Y. 1981) (“[T]he individual’s
silence in such circumstances may simply be attributable to his awareness that
he is under no obligation to speak or to the natural caution that arises from his
knowledge that anything he says might later be used against him at trial.”)).
112. United States v. Cummiskey, 728 F.2d 200, 206 (3d Cir. 1984)
(establishing that when offering evidence of silence, “it is the prosecutor’s
burden, under Rule 104(b), to establish that Miranda warnings were not given
prior to the silence relied upon for impeachment purposes”).
113. No. A-8066, 2003 WL 1922623 (Alaska Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2003).
114. Id. at *1.
115. Id. at *2.
116. Id. at *1.
117. Id. at *1–2.
118. Id.
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assaults.119 The court held that the minimal Rule 104(b) “conditional
relevance” threshold governs the admissibility of prior bad acts.120 The
Ayagarak court determined that a reasonable juror could have believed
the victim and could thus conclude that Ayagarak had committed all of
the prior assaults.121 The Ayagarak court noted that where the relevance
of the prior-event testimony depends on a credibility assessment, such
an assessment is properly in the province of the jurors, not the judge.122
“Evidence Rule 104(b) normally leaves the resolution of a predicate fact
to the jury—particularly when resolution of that disputed fact hinges on
credibility.”123 The Ayagarak court specifically rejected a claim that the
judge must determine that the prior event be proven by “clear and
convincing” evidence as a predicate for admissibility.124
Very recently, the court of appeals faced a similar issue in Bennett v.
Municipality.125 Bennett was convicted of assaulting his wife.126 On
appeal, he contended that the court erred by admitting testimony about
his prior assault of his wife under Alaska Rule of Evidence 404(b)(4).127
Bennett argued that this prior incident should not have been admitted as
a “crime of domestic violence” because he did not “assault” his wife on
the prior occasion, but rather injured her in self-defense.128 Judge Coats
reasoned that the prosecutor had sustained her Rule 104(b) burden, even
with the victim’s testimony standing alone:
In this case, the Municipality offered sufficient evidence for a
reasonable juror to conclude that the 2005 incident was an act
of domestic violence: Celeste Bennett testified that, after she
insulted Steven during an argument, he knocked her to the
ground, hit her repeatedly on the side of her face and choked
her, leaving her with two black eyes, bruises on her neck, and
broken blood capillaries in her right eye. Once the court made
the preliminary finding of sufficient evidence required by
Evidence Rule 104(b), the strength of the Municipality’s
evidence of the prior act was just one factor for Judge
Swiderski to consider in balancing the probative value of the
119. Id. at *2.
120. Id. at *5.
121. Id. at *2.
122. Id. at *5.
123. Id.
124. Id. at *6. In the domestic violence context, the Ninth Circuit reached the
same conclusion in an opinion issued nine years before Ayagarak. United States
v. Hinton, 31 F.3d 817, 823 (9th Cir. 1994).
125. 205 P.3d 1113 (Alaska Ct. App. 2009).
126. Id. at 1114.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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evidence against the risk that Bennett would be unfairly
prejudiced. Judge Swiderski determined that the evidence
should not be excluded under Evidence Rule 403; it then
became the jury’s duty to evaluate the credibility of the
Bennetts’ conflicting testimony on this incident, and to decide
what weight, if any, to give the evidence in assessing Bennett’s
guilt of the charged assault.129
In Bennett, we encounter a classic application of Rule 104(b) and the
judge’s limited gate-keeping role. Because admissibility of Bennett’s
prior assaultive act hinged on a credibility determination (whether the
jury believed Bennett or his wife), the judge’s proper role was simply to
inquire whether a juror, acting reasonably, could find that Bennett had
committed the prior assault. The judge was not required to rule that the
prior assault had actually occurred,130 to find the prior event proven by
“clear and convincing evidence,”131 or to weigh the credibility of
witnesses.132 Rather, under Smith v. State, the judge was required to view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the proponent.133 In other
words, the judge could not properly refuse to admit the evidence
because he did not personally believe that Bennett had acted in selfdefense on the prior occasion. Such a decision would have been an
improper invasion on the role of the jury and on the prosecution’s right
to have the jury resolve disputed facts.134
2. Drug Crimes
Criminal law practitioners routinely confront conditional relevance
issues in street drug prosecutions. A defendant will often admit that he
was present at a location where police seized drugs and contraband but
claim that he was unaware that drugs were present. In such cases,
129. Id. at 1117–18 (citation omitted).
130. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 690 (1988) (“[T]he trial
court neither weighs credibility nor makes a finding that the Government has
proved the conditional fact by a preponderance of the evidence. The court
simply examines all the evidence in the case and decides whether the jury could
reasonably find the conditional fact.”).
131. See Ayagarak v. State, No. A-8066, 2003 WL 1922623 at *6 (Alaska Ct.
App. Apr. 23, 2003).
132. See Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 690 (“In determining whether the Government
has introduced sufficient evidence to meet Rule 104(b), the trial court neither
weighs credibility nor makes a finding that the Government has proved the
conditional fact by a preponderance of the evidence.”).
133. See Smith v. State, No. A-7964, 2004 WL 719993, at *5 (Alaska Ct. App.
Mar. 31, 2004).
134. See ALASKA R. EVID. 104(b) advisory committee’s notes (“If preliminary
questions of conditional relevancy were determined solely by the judge . . . the
functioning of the jury as a trier of fact would be greatly restricted and in some
cases virtually destroyed.”).
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prosecutors will typically offer evidence of the defendant’s prior drug
crimes to establish the defendant’s knowledge about what drugs look
like and how they are packaged, to demonstrate absence of mistake or
accident.135 But what if those prior drug crimes have not resulted in
convictions? The court of appeals has relied on Rule 104(b) to reach the
same result as the Ayagarak and Bennett courts.
In Goan v. State,136 the defendant was charged with selling LSD to
an undercover informant.137 The trial judge admitted evidence that the
informant had bought LSD on three prior uncharged occasions, in the
weeks before the charged sale.138 The informant could not testify that
Goan had directly participated in the prior sales.139 The trial judge,
however, admitted the testimony because the circumstances of the prior
sales were similar.140 Judge Coats explained:
In determining whether the state has introduced sufficient
evidence to satisfy Rule 104(b), the court examines all the
evidence in the case and decides whether the jury could
reasonably find the conditional fact by a preponderance of the
evidence. The trial court neither weighs credibility nor makes a
finding that the state has proved the conditional fact. . . .
Considering all the evidence, a question of fact was created as
to whether [the undercover police officer] had dealt with Goan
in the previous transactions. A reasonable juror could infer
from the evidence that there was a consistent pattern in the
four transactions. Given the similarity of the details, a juror
could conclude that the details of who was involved and where
they did business were also the same. Therefore, Judge Savell
acted within his discretion in allowing the evidence of the three
prior sales to go to the jury for factual determination.141

135. See ALASKA R. EVID. 404(b)(1); see also Cunningham v. State, Nos. A-6717,
4090, 1999 WL 602980 (Alaska Ct. App. Aug. 11, 1999); Valcarcel v. State, No. A6741, 1999 WL 296286 (Alaska Ct. App. May 12, 1999); Backus v. State, No. A5904, 1997 WL 216823 (Alaska Ct. App. Apr. 30, 1997) (all affirming admission of
evidence of prior drug offenses to establish knowledge and absence of mistake
or accident); Clark v. State, 704 P.2d 799, 806 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (affirming
admission of defendant’s possession of a set of weighing scales to prove intent to
sell marijuana).
136. No. A-2908, 1989 WL 1597111 (Alaska Ct. App. Dec. 13, 1989).
137. Id. at *1–3 (citing Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 690).
138. See id. at *4.
139. Id.
140. Id. at *5.
141. Id.
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3. Spoliation: Witness Threats, Intimidation and Cover-up Behavior
Alaska law holds that spoliation conduct—a defendant’s threats to
witnesses, attempts to bribe police officers or witnesses, and attempts at
evidence tampering—are admissible to prove a defendant’s
consciousness of guilt.142 This is true even where the questioned conduct
is committed by third parties.143 In street crime prosecution, third-party
attempts to silence or intimidate adverse witnesses are not uncommon.
What standard of proof must the proponent sustain to trigger
admissibility of the third-party conduct? No Alaska case squarely
answers the question.144 But, the defendant’s connection to the
intimidation attempt—just as his awareness of facts that give rise to his
motive—is a disputed factual issue. If the defendant authorized or
encouraged the intimidation, the evidence is relevant to show his
consciousness of guilt. Therefore, the issue raises a disputed factual
issue, and a judge should analyze the point under Rule 104(b).
D.

Authentication

Criminal trial practitioners frequently confront evidentiary
disputes regarding authentication issues. Yet, practitioners very rarely
frame debates regarding authentication of photographs or audio
recordings in conditional relevance terms. But, in fact, the concepts are
very closely intertwined. Consider these examples:


Narcotics detectives record an informant’s telephone
conversation with a man setting up a cocaine deal. Police
later arrest a man they believe to be the seller and whose
voice they believe they can identify on the tape. The

142. See, e.g., Garrett v. State, No. A-6266, 1997 WL 1865, *5 (Alaska Ct. App.
Jan. 2, 1997) (“Evidence that Garrett offered to give Officer Stevenson something
if the officer let him go home is admissible to show Garrett’s consciousness that
he was intoxicated and that he was driving with a suspended license.”).
143. Stumpf v. State, 749 P.2d 880, 898–99 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (“Evidence
that a third party attempted to intimidate a witness is admissible against a
defendant as manifesting a consciousness of guilt. The state, however, must first
establish that the defendant authorized the actions. The defendant’s connection
to the threats may be shown by direct or circumstantial evidence.”); see also
Wortham v. State, 617 P.2d 510, 512 (Alaska 1980) (quoting Saunders v. State, 346
A.2d 448, 450–51 (Md. Ct. App. 1975) (“[T]he authorization by the accused may
be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence and an inference may be
sufficient to connect the accused.”)).
144. Federal authority does provide an answer. In United States v. Maddox,
944 F.2d 1223, 1226 (6th Cir. 1991), a government witness testified that the
defendant threatened her during a trial recess. The defendant denied it, and
testimony from the court security officer was ambiguous. Id. The Sixth Circuit
held that the issue was governed by Rule 104(b). Id. at 1229–30.
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defendant denies that he is the speaker and argues that he
has a brother whose voice sounds like his.
Police seize a photograph of a man engaged in a sexual act
with a young person from the man’s computer. Police
assert that the photograph depicts the computer owner
having sex with a minor, and they arrest the man. Police
assert that they can identify the man but are unable to
identify the young person. Police maintain that they are
able to establish the location of the photograph
circumstantially and the age of the second person by close
examination of the computer’s electronic data and careful
review of the room depicted in the photograph itself. The
defendant makes no admissions regarding whether he is
the person depicted in the photograph, whether the other
person is a child, or the location of the photograph.

How does a judge resolve these authentication problems? Alaska
Rule of Evidence 901 governs authentication, and states, “The
requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent
to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding
that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.”145 Thus, Rule
901 uses the same rubric as Rule 104(b): the standard of “evidence
sufficient to support a finding.”146 In fact, the Alaska Rule’s commentary
expressly links Rule 901 with Rule 104(b), noting that “[t]his
requirement of showing authenticity or identity falls in the category of
relevancy dependent upon fulfillment of a condition of fact and is
governed by the procedure set forth in Rule 104(b).”147
Under Rule 104(b), the order of proof is left to the discretion of the
trial judge.148 The proponent “need only make a prima facie showing of
authenticity, as ‘the rule requires only that the court admit evidence if
sufficient proof has been introduced so that a reasonable juror could
find in favor of authenticity or identification.’”149 After the evidence has
145. ALASKA R. EVID. 901.
146. ALASKA R. EVID. 104(b).
147. See ALASKA R. EVID. 901 (citing FED. R. EVID. 901 advisory committee’s
notes). The advisory committee’s notes to Federal Rule of Evidence 901 draw the
same link to Federal Rule of Evidence 104(b). See, e.g., United States v. Black, 767
F.2d 1334, 1342 (9th Cir. 1985).
148. FED. R. EVID. 104(b) advisory committee’s notes.
149. United States v. Black, 767 F.2d 1334, 1342 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing 5 J.
WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE para. 901(a)(01), at 901-16 to 90117 (1983)); see also Ricketts v. City of Hartford, 74 F.3d 1397, 1411 (2d Cir. 1996)
(disapproving a judge’s ruling excluding a tape recording where the judge did
not believe that the recorded voice was the defendant’s). “The district court’s
determination that it ‘was not satisfied that the voice on the tape was that of
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been admitted, “[t]he credibility or probative force of the evidence
offered is, ultimately, an issue for the jury.”150
Alaska courts have consistently applied this principle. In Dillard v.
Municipality of Anchorage,151 a defendant objected to admission of a
recording of his arrest made by a police officer with a pocket recorder. 152
The defendant argued that the tape was garbled and claimed that it was
difficult to determine whose voices were actually captured on the
tape.153 The court of appeals ruled that the issue was governed by Rule
104(b), and therefore, as long as the judge found that the jury had a
“reasoned basis” to conclude that the defendant’s voice was on the tape,
“this issue was for the jury to decide.”154
The court of appeals reached the same result four years later in
Wyatt v. State.155 Wyatt was tried for killing his wife.156 The prosecutor
offered testimony from a crisis center worker, who testified that the day
before the victim disappeared, she had received a call from a woman
who identified herself as “Diane Wyatt,” asked about divorce, and said
that “there was a possible lethal situation when she told her husband
about [the divorce].”157 The defense argued that the evidence
establishing the identity of the caller as Wyatt’s wife was insufficient.158
The court of appeals held that the judge properly submitted the issue to
the jury, even in the face of the factual dispute.159 The Wyatt court noted
that the judge gave a proper limiting instruction and told the jury to
consider the testimony about the call “if you find that she made the
statement.”160
Davis,’ is inconsistent with [Rule 104(b)] principles. So long as a jury is entitled
to reach a contrary conclusion, it must be given the opportunity to do so.” Id.
(citation omitted).
150. Black, 767 F.2d at 1342.
151. No. A-4496, 1993 WL 13156859 (Alaska Ct. App. Oct. 13, 1993).
152. Id. at *4–5.
153. Id.
154. Id. (citing ALASKA R. EVID. 104(b) advisory committee’s notes); see also
James v. State, 671 P.2d 885, 893 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983), rev’d on other grounds,
698 P.2d 1161 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (reaching the same result without referring
to Rule 104(b); affirms the admissibility of a recording of a 911 call despite the
fact that the identity of the caller was disputed).
155. No. 3607, 1997 WL 250441 (Alaska Ct. App. May 14, 1997), aff’d, 981 P.2d
109 (Alaska 1999).
156. Id. at *1.
157. Id. at *3.
158. Id. at *4 n.2.
159. Id.
160. Id; see also Hough v. State, No. A-6359, 1998 WL 253998, at *5–6 (Alaska
Ct. App. May 20, 1998). In Hough, there was an issue regarding admission of
testimony about a telephone call in which defendant admitted to a shooting. Id.
at *5. The speaker’s identity was supported by the context of the conversation,
nicknames used, sound of the speaker’s voice, the witness’s familiarity with the
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Most recently, in Thompson v. State,161 Thompson was charged with
sexual abuse of a minor for having sex with a thirteen-year-old girl.162
During the investigation, police obtained a Glass warrant that
authorized surreptitious recording of telephone conversations between
Thompson and the girl’s mother.163 The investigating officers left the
recording equipment with the mother.164 She then recorded two
conversations in which Thompson admitted to both knowing the girl
was thirteen years old and to having sex with her.165 No law
enforcement officer was present when the calls were recorded.166 Before
trial, the defense objected to the admission of the tapes, arguing that no
law enforcement officer could authenticate the tapes or testify about the
precise date that the conversations occurred.167
The court of appeals held that Rules 901 and 104(b) governed the
issue, stating: “[t]hus, the modern test for authentication ‘is . . .
[whether] the proponent [of the evidence has] presented sufficient
evidence to support a rational finding [that] the tape recording is
authentic.’”168 The court held that evidence questioning the authenticity
of a recording may be introduced to attack the credibility of the
recording, but does not bar its admission into evidence.169
The Thompson court also noted that Rules 901 and 104(b) govern the
threshold standard for admission of a photograph.170 In fact, the court of
appeals had reached the same conclusion twenty years earlier. In Bell v.

defendant, and the witness’s opinion that defendant was the caller. The court
held that admissibility was governed by Rules 104(b) and 901. Id. (citing United
States v. Watson, 594 F.2d 1330, 1335 (10th Cir. 1979) (stating “once ‘any basis for
identifying the voice’ has been shown, questions of weight and credibility are for
the jury”)); see also State v. Danielson, 681 P.2d 260, 261 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984)
(holding the identification requirement is “met if sufficient proof is introduced
to permit a reasonable trier of fact to find in favor of identification”)).
161. 210 P.3d 1233 (Alaska Ct. App. 2009).
162. Id. at 1233.
163. Id. at 1234; see also id. at 1234 n.2 (citing State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872
(Alaska 1978) (holding that under the Alaska Constitution, the police “must
obtain a warrant before electronically monitoring or recording a private
conversation,” even if one of the participants has consented to the surveillance)).
164. Id. at 1234.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1234–35.
168. Id. at 1238–39 (citing EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED & DANIEL D. BLINKA,
CRIMINAL EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS 134 (2d ed. 2007)). For a helpful discussion
of the interplay between Rules 104(b) and 901 in the context of questioned
surveillance audio and videotapes, see United States v. Stephens, 202 F.Supp. 2d
1361, 1367–68 (N.D. Ga. 2002).
169. Thompson, 210 P.3d at 1239.
170. Id.
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State,171 the victim equivocated about whether her injuries, which were
depicted in police photographs, were actually caused by the
defendant.172 At trial, the victim testified that she was uncertain about
the cause of the injuries.173 On voir dire, the victim stated that she
thought the injuries were probably “from running into tables and stuff”
while she was intoxicated.174 She was impeached with her own prior
testimony, where she had attributed the injuries to Bell.175 Judge
Singleton wrote:
Bell argues . . . that the court, not the jury, must determine the
relevance of evidence sought to be admitted at trial [under
Alaska Rules of Evidence 104(a) and (b)]. In Bell’s view, Judge
White erroneously ruled that the question of relevance was to
be determined by the jury. Second, Bell argues that there was
an inadequate foundation for the admission of the photographs
because Grant could not positively identify the origins of her
injuries. Alaska Rule of Evidence 901 requires the
authentication and identification of an exhibit as a condition
precedent to its admissibility. We find no error. First of all, we
are of the view that Judge White was simply applying [Alaska
Rule of Evidence] 104(b) in admitting the photographs. In
essence, he was leaving it up to the jury not to determine a
legal question, but rather to determine whether the
photographs, in fact, depicted injuries inflicted on Grant by
Bell. The ultimate relevance of the exhibits depended upon this
factual determination which was properly left to the jury.
Secondly, we are satisfied that there was sufficient
authentication and identification of the photographs. As we
noted in our earlier opinion, Grant sought medical attention
after each separate beating, and reported both offenses to the
police. In each case, she was examined by a treating physician
and interviewed by an investigating officer. In this case, the
photographs were properly authenticated by the investigating
officer and the attending physician. Under the circumstances, it
was a factual question as to whether the photographs
accurately depicted injuries inflicted upon Grant by Bell.176

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

No. A-1873, 1988 WL 1513110 (Alaska Ct. App. Nov. 23, 1988)
Id at *2–3.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *3 (citation omitted).
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The Bell court squarely rejected a defense claim that resolution of
disputed facts was a role for the judge.177 Instead, it specifically held that
the relevance of the photographs was an issue for the jury, not the
judge.178 It also implicitly held that conditional relevance could be
satisfied by foundational evidence contained in a prior inconsistent
statement.179
E.

Defense Applications

As we have seen, the Rule 104(b) “reasonably debatable” standard
governs admissibility where relevance depends on a disputed factual
issue. This Article focuses on challenges to prosecution evidence; yet, the
rule is party-neutral. Theoretically, Rule 104(b)’s proponent-friendly,
liberal admissibility threshold applies regardless of the proponent’s
identity. In other words, the rule is no different for the defense lawyer
than it is for the prosecutor.
In criminal cases, however, the prosecutor bears the burden of
proof and thus presents his evidence first. Appellate challenges are most
commonly mounted by criminal defendants to admission of the
prosecution’s evidence, and rarely the other way around.180
Accordingly, in the preceding sections, we have seen illustrative
examples of Alaska courts applying Rule 104(b) to the prosecutor’s
conditionally relevant evidence. Can defense attorneys employ the same
evidentiary principle to secure admission of defense evidence?
1. Self-defense; Awareness of Opponent’s Prior, Specific Violent Acts
What if the defendant in an assault prosecution claims that he was
aware of a prior, specific, violent act committed by the victim?
Furthermore, what if the defendant asserts that knowledge caused him
to be afraid of the victim, providing support for his claim that he acted
reasonably in self-defense? Alaska law has long held that the evidence of
prior specific violent conduct of which the defendant is subjectively
aware is admissible in support of a self-defense claim.181 But what if the
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. In Alaska, a prior inconsistent statement may be considered for its
substantive truth, not merely for its impeachment value. See State v. Batts, 195
P.3d 144, 158 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008) (citing Beavers v. State, 492 P.2d 88, 94
(Alaska 1971)); see also COMMENTARY TO THE ALASKA R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A)
(drawing a contrast to the federal rule)).
180. For a rare example of a prosecution appeal of disputed conditionally
relevant defense evidence, see People v. Lyle, 613 P.2d 896, 899 (Colo. 1980).
181. See, e.g., McCracken v. State, 914 P.2d 893 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996)
(explaining that a defendant who admits to assault but claims self-defense is
entitled to introduce evidence establishing his awareness of specific violent acts
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prosecutor objects that the evidence is insufficient to establish that the
defendant was “really” subjectively aware of the prior assaultive event
before the charged assault? What if the prosecution objects that the
defendant’s claim is fabricated and claims that the defendant only
learned of his opponent’s prior violent acts from reading police reports
provided in discovery after he was charged?
While no Alaska case squarely answers these questions, Rule 104(b)
does provide some guidance. The issue is a classic example of
conditional relevance. If the defendant was aware of the past act before
the charged assault, his testimony on the point is admissible. If he was
not aware of the act, then it is irrelevant. Thus, whether the defendant
knew of a prior specific violent act beforehand is a factual controversy,
which the defendant is entitled to have resolved by the jury.
Rule 104(b) governs the court’s ruling. If the defense attorney can
present evidence “sufficient to support a finding” that the defendant
was aware of the victim’s prior acts before the charged assault, the judge
has a duty to submit the issue to the jury for its determination.182
Perhaps surprisingly, only a single, unreported Alaska appellate
decision addresses this issue, and then only obliquely.183 At least one
sister state court has expressly held that Evidence Rule 104(b) governs
this issue.184
2. Prior False Claim of Sexual Assault
As we have seen, in the thirty years since the supreme court’s
promulgation of Alaska’s evidence rules, Alaska courts have repeatedly
held that admissibility of conditionally relevant evidence is governed by
Rule 104(b). In one recent case, however, the Alaska Court of Appeals
committed by decedent to prove reasonableness of his action); James Fayette, If
You Knew Him Like I Did, You’d Have Shot Him Too…: A Survey of Alaska’s Law of
Self-Defense, 23 ALASKA L. REV. 171, 219–22 (2008).
182. Smith v. State, No. A-7964, 2004 WL 719993, at *5 (Alaska Ct. App. Mar.
31, 2004).
183. See Thompson v. State, No. A-3055, 1990 WL 10509491, at *3–5 (Alaska
Ct. App. Nov. 21, 1990) (holding that the evidence that the defendant knew of a
prior bad act by the victim, causing his fear, was “tenuous” and could thus be
excluded as failing to satisfy Rule 104(b)). The Thompson opinion is interesting
for two reasons. First, the Thompson court’s holding that the third-party report of
the prior bad act was not “hearsay” because it was not offered for its truth
foreshadowed, by six years, the McCracken holding. See id. at *4. Second, the 1990
Thompson opinion was written by Superior Court Judge Elaine Andrews, seated
as a court of appeals judge, pro temp. See id. at *1. Twelve years later, Judge
Andrews presided over the Edwards homicide trial. See generally Trial Transcript,
supra note 3.
184. Lyle, 613 P.2d at 899 (holding that the defendant offered sufficient direct
and circumstantial evidence that he was aware of the decedent’s prior bad acts
to satisfy Rule 104(b), triggering admission of the evidence to the jury).
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departed from its own precedent and from Rule 104(b). As this section
explains, that opinion, Morgan v. State,185 is inconsistent with the court of
appeals’ own precedent and is arguably constitutionally infirm.
In Covington v. State,186 the court of appeals held that a defendant
charged with sexual assault may offer proof that the victim had made
previous false accusations of sexual assault, despite the usual rule
against impeachment by proof of a witness’s specific prior false
statements.187 Seventeen years later, in Morgan, the court of appeals
clarified Covington, holding that a prior specific false report of sexual
assault was only admissible if the defendant could convince the trial judge
by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the complaining witness made
another accusation of sexual assault; (2) this accusation was factually
untrue; and (3) the complaining witness knew that the accusation was
untrue.188
The Morgan court incorrectly declined to apply Rule 104(b) to what
is clearly a disputed factual issue. If the prior report was “really” false, it
should be deemed relevant and admissible under Covington. If the prior
report was “really” true, then it is not relevant. Therefore, it should be
the jury that determines whether the prior claim was true or false. There
is no intellectually sound way to distinguish this factual dispute from
the admissibility of a disputed defendant’s statement, disputed motive
evidence, or the commission of prior relevant acts.189 The policy reasons
that the Morgan court claims support its result are unpersuasive. The
Morgan court stated:
[I]f we were to adopt the “some evidence” test used in
Louisiana and Wisconsin, a test which merely requires
sufficient evidence to put the matter in doubt, then we would
be encouraging trials within trials, and we would also throw
open the doors to debates about a complaining witness’s sexual
history based on dubious evidence. 190

185. 54 P.3d 332 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
186. 703 P.2d 436 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
187. Id. at 441–42. The Covington court held that false report evidence was
admissible if, as a foundational matter, the defendant established the falsity of
the prior accusations “as, for example, where the charges somehow had been
disproved or where the witness had conceded their falsity . . . .” Id.
188. Morgan, 54 P.3d at 333; see also Copeland v. State, 70 P.3d 1118, 1124
(Alaska Ct. App. 2003) (holding that the testimony of a man previously accused
of sexual assault by the victim was inadmissible because there was insufficient
evidence to support his story).
189. Thus, Morgan is squarely at odds with Marino, Thompson, Bennett,
Ayagarak, McCormack, and Smith.
190. Morgan, 54 P.3d at 339.
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But as Alaska’s evidence rules recognize, and as we have seen,
resolution of factual disputes is the proper province of the jury.191
Litigation of the truth or falsity of a discrete, prior false accusation may
be time-consuming, but it represents time well-spent for a defendant
facing the prospect of decades of incarceration. It is no more timeconsuming than litigating disputes about the defendant’s true motive,
his prior statements, or his commission of past relevant acts—all of
which the court of appeals has analyzed under Rule 104(b).192
Alaska’s trial judges retain broad discretion to place reasonable
limits on the presentation of cumulative or distracting evidence and may
even limit the proponent to a pre-approved list of leading questions.193
Thus, the Morgan court’s fears about “trials within trials” are unsound.
Finally, evidence of a prior false report of a sexual assault does not run
afoul of the rape shield statute, because that statute is limited to
evidence of the victim’s sexual conduct.194 A false report of a sexual
assault is not evidence of sexual conduct; rather, it is evidence of a
specific false allegation of sexual conduct.195
Constitutionally, Morgan is open to criticism, because it creates the
possibility that a defendant may be denied the opportunity to prove that
his accuser lied in the past where he offers “reasonably debatable” proof
that the jury might credit, but which fails to subjectively convince the judge.
Viewed in this light, Morgan is inconsistent with the defendant’s right to

191. As Judge Coats acknowledged in his Morgan concurring opinion,
“whether [the witnesses supporting Morgan’s claim that his accuser made false
allegations] were credible or not is the kind of question that fact finders deal
with on a regular basis.” Id. at 341.
192. Courts examined the following cases under ALASKA R. EVID. 104(b):
Smith, McCormack (motive), Marino (statements), and Ayagarak (past relevant
acts).
193. See ALASKA R. EVID. 611(a)(2)–(3); Heaps v. State, 30 P.3d 109 (Alaska Ct.
App. 2001).
194. Admissibility of testimony about a victim’s “previous sexual conduct” is
governed by Alaska’s rape shield statute. ALASKA STAT. §12.45.045(a) (2008).
195. The statute requires a judicial finding of relevance prior to admission of
such evidence. Id. Alaska law bars prior sexual conduct evidence when the
“relevance” of this evidence rests on the impermissible inference that the victim
is likely to have freely engaged in sexual relations with the defendant because
the victim had freely engaged in sexual relations with other people. Napoka v.
State, 996 P.2d 106, 108 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000); see also State v. DeSantis, 456
N.W.2d 600, 605 n.4 (Wis. 1990) (collecting cases which hold that rape shield
statutes do not bar evidence of a prior untruthful accusation, because the
proponent usually seeks to prove that the claim was false).
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have a jury decide disputed facts,196 and with his right to present a
defense.197
Morgan is all the more curious because it seemingly stands at odds
with a decision reached by the court of appeals just two years earlier. In
Weaver v. State,198 the defendant was charged with sexual abuse of a
teenage girl.199 He sought to prove that the victim fabricated the
allegation, arguing that the victim had become sexually active with
other partners prior to his indictment.200 He theorized that the victim
fabricated the allegation to engender sympathy because she was afraid
her parents would discover her sexual activity.201 The trial judge
excluded testimony about the victim’s prior sexual conduct.202 The court
of appeals noted that the testimony was not barred by the rape shield
statute, because Weaver did not seek to prove the victim’s general
promiscuity.203 They also found that the trial judge erred in part, because
he based his ruling on a specific finding regarding the chronology of the
prior sexual conduct.204 Because testimony on this point was disputed, it
was erroneous for the judge to resolve this issue. Judge Mannheimer
explained:
One aspect of Judge Card’s ruling appears to be mistaken. As
explained above, most of the witnesses testified that Veronica
became sexually active in May 1997, but one witness testified
that she became sexually active in January 1997. Judge Card
credited the majority of the witnesses and ruled that Veronica
had become sexually active in May. The judge should not have
resolved this discrepancy. When a party seeks to introduce
evidence, and the relevancy of that evidence turns on the
resolution of a subsidiary question of fact, a trial judge should
196. See Folger v. State, 648 P.2d 111, 113–14 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (holding
that even weak and doubtful self-defense claims are to be resolved by the jury).
197. See Smithart v. State, 988 P.2d 583, 591 (Alaska 1999) (quoting Keith v.
State, 612 P.2d 977, 984 (Alaska 1980) (“Defendants are ‘entitled to present [their]
version of the events and the evidence supporting it in as full a manner as
possible.’”)); see also Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 233 (1988) (restricting
cross-examination of victim in a sexual assault case regarding her cohabitation
with a third party deprived the defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to
confront adverse witnesses); United States v. Platero, 72 F.3d 806, 814–16 (10th
Cir. 1995) (excluding evidence, in sexual assault case, about the alleged victim’s
romantic or sexual relationship with a third party violated the defendant’s
confrontation rights).
198. No. A-7081, 4271, 2000 WL 1287937 (Alaska Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2000).
199. Id. at *1.
200. Id. at *2.
201. Id.
202. Id. at *3.
203. Id.
204. Id. at *4.
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admit the offered evidence “upon, or subject to, the
introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding” in the
moving party’s favor on this subsidiary question of fact. Thus,
if the relevance of Veronica’s sexual activity had hinged on
whether that activity occurred in May 1997 or in January 1997,
then Judge Card should have admitted the evidence—because
Weaver presented a foundational witness who testified that
Veronica’s sexual activity occurred in January.205
Ultimately, while acknowledging that the trial judge violated Rule
104(b) by deciding a disputed factual issue, the Weaver court affirmed
the trial judge’s exclusion of the defense evidence under Rule 403—
finding that testimony about the victim’s prior sexual conduct was likely
to be confusing and unfairly prejudicial to the prosecution.206 The Weaver
court reaffirmed, in dicta, that reasonably debatable disputed factual
issues are properly submitted to the jury under Rule 104(b).207 Yet, two
years later, the Morgan court reached the opposite conclusion: that
defense claims of a specific past false allegation—a disputed factual
event—was not subject to Rule 104(b) analysis. However, the allegation
was subject to the trial judge’s ruling that falsity was established by a
preponderance—a procedure essentially identical to Rule 104(a).208
Therefore, it is very difficult to reconcile Weaver with Morgan—and
equally difficult to reconcile Morgan, which affirmed exclusion of
exculpatory defense evidence, with the post-2003 Alaska Rule 104(b)
cases that affirmed admission of disputed, inculpatory prosecution
evidence. When one compares the Morgan holding with the post-2003
Alaska cases discussed in this Article, the best one can say is that Morgan
is intellectually inconsistent.209
205. Id. (citation omitted). Judge Card’s error resonates with United States v.
Koontz, 143 F.3d 408, 411–12 (8th Cir. 1998) (the ruling was error where the trial
judge admitted a disputed jail booking report based upon his subjective belief
that the subject of a disputed jail booking report and a defense trial witness were
“the same person”; the issue was one for the jury, not the judge).
206. Id. at *5.
207. Id. at *4.
208. In fact, the Morgan court drew a direct comparison to admissibility of coconspirator statements, which is governed by Rule 104(a). Morgan v. State, 54
P.3d 332, 339 n.36 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002) (citing Arnold v. State, 751 P.2d 494,
502 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988)); see also Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987)
(Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) governs preliminary findings regarding the
existence and duration of a conspiracy and admissibility of co-conspirator
statements).
209. Morgan also raises a technically intriguing ambiguity. We know from
Bourjaily and Rule 104(a) itself that the judge is not bound by the rules of
evidence when ruling on preliminary matters. Thus, the judge may consider
otherwise inadmissible hearsay when deciding whether the accused belonged to
a conspiracy and the duration of a conspiracy. Therefore, if a Morgan
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CONCLUSION
Mark Edwards was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder
for killing Mona Edwards and Maela Crabtree.210 Edwards died in jail in
2004.211 Because Edwards died with a pending appeal, his appeal was
mooted, and his convictions were posthumously vacated.212 Therefore,
Judge Andrews’ ruling regarding admissibility of Mona’s letter escaped
appellate review.
But, as we have seen in this Article, in the years since Edwards’
2002 trial, the Alaska Court of Appeals has decided five Rule 104(b)
cases.213 In each case, the court affirmed admission of disputed
prosecution evidence where the evidence was “reasonably debatable”
and where the proponent offered “evidence sufficient to support” the
jury’s finding that the event occurred. Twice, the court relied upon Rule
104(b) to affirm admission of disputed prosecution motive evidence—
which was exactly the prosecution’s goal in the Edwards trial.214 With the
benefit of perfect hindsight, one can now see that Judge Andrews’ 2002
ruling was correct. It is equally clear that had Mark Edwards lived, he
would have seen Judge Andrews’ ruling regarding the admissibility of
Maela’s letter and his conviction affirmed.
To busy criminal law practitioners, the law of conditional relevance
is a seemingly obscure evidentiary nuance. However, as we have seen,
Rule 104(b) haunts criminal trial fact patterns with startling frequency.
The rule comes into play whenever factual disputes arise regarding
preliminary hearing is essentially governed by Rule 104(a), as the court implied,
is the defendant bound by the rules of evidence at this hearing? Rule 104(a) and
Bourjaily would support an argument that the court is not bound by the rules of
evidence at such a preliminary hearing. If this is true, then could the defendant
offer rank hearsay to the judge at the preliminary hearing regarding the falsity of
the victim’s prior claim? Or could the prosecutor offer rank hearsay establishing
that the prior claim was true? Unfortunately, the Morgan opinion does not reach
this point.
210. Edwards v. State, No. A-8507 (Alaska Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2003) (statement
of points on appeal) (on file with the Alaska Law Review).
211. Sheila Toomey, Man Who Killed Wife, Her Roommate Dies in Prison,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, July 8, 2004.
212. If a defendant in a criminal case dies while his appeal is pending, the
judgment against the defendant is vacated and the charges against him are
abated ab initio. Hartwell v. State, 423 P.2d 282, 284 (Alaska 1967). For an
interesting discussion of this issue, see McCurdy v. State, No. A-08816, 2006 WL
2390260, at *1 (Alaska Ct. App. Aug. 18, 2006).
213. See, e.g., Bennett v. State, 205 P.3d 1113 (Alaska Ct. App. 2009);
Thompson v. State, 210 P.3d 1233 (Alaska Ct. App. 2009); McCormack v. State,
No. A-9870, 2008 WL 5352364 (Alaska Ct. App. Dec. 24, 2008); Smith v. State, No.
1912, 2004 WL 719993 (Alaska Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2004); Ayagarak v. State, No. A8066, 2003 WL 1922623 (Alaska Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2003).
214. McCormack, 2008 WL 5352364 at *3–4; Smith, 2004 WL 719993, at *4.
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“other relevant acts” testimony, proof of motive, disputed statements,
and audio recording or photographic authenticity. For these reasons,
prosecutors in particular should be very familiar with the principles
explained in this Article.
While most frequently prosecutors will make use of this principle,
as we have seen, defense attorneys can, and should, invoke the same
rule in appropriate circumstances. The Authors hope this discussion will
be of use to the bench and the Bar when such issues arise again in the
future.

